The Cost of Elephant Conservation
By Jason Wang
For the African elephant, misinformation emerged as the unlikely savior the species needed. Africa is in the midst of an elephant slaughter that could eradicate the population in the near future. In spite of the 1990 international ban on ivory, poachers kill more than tens of thousands of elephants per year to capitalize on the growing demand from Asian countries, where elephant ivory, or “white gold,” projects wealth [1]. The Elephant Action League, or EAL, is in the middle of this wildlife war, emerging in 2013 as the world’s first intelligence agency devoted to fighting environmental crimes [2]. The league’s activities eventually uncovered a massive influx of ivory into Somalia. In a two-year investigation into illegal poaching in Africa, the EAL faced off against al-Shabaab, a Somali Islamist insurgent group and transnational terrorist affiliate of al-Qaeda. In an eighteen-month investigation spanning from Ethiopia to Kenya, the organization reported that the illicit ivory trade financed a significant portion of al-Shabaab’s activities. Unfortunately, the report proved to be inaccurate. Media outlets, however, had already dispersed that information to the world, magnifying the ivory-terrorism linkage beyond what it really was. Though the report ultimately promoted conservation efforts, al-Shabaab’s finances were largely unaffected by anti-poaching legislation. Due to the novelty of the inaccurate report, the EAL and its investigation exploded into the spotlight as accidental heroes, pushing terrorism to the front of elephant conservation efforts, leading to the spread of misinformation that consequently distracted policymakers from the actual forces that prop up al-Shabaab.
In a hotel room in Nairobi, Kenya, two Somali traffickers revealed the role of al-Shabaab, or “The Youth,” in the illicit ivory trade. Unlike other armed groups in Africa, al-Shabaab did not directly participate in the poaching of elephants [3]. Rather, the insurgent group played the role of the middleman in the ivory trade. The group would first receive orders from various buyers. From there, the al-Shabaab salesmen would reach out to its extensive network of contractors in order to recruit poachers to fulfill the order. The ivory is then fenced by al-Shabaab, ultimately generating monthly revenues of $200,000 — equal to $2.4 million per year [4]. The EAL thus asserted that al-Shabaab derived as much as 40% of its running costs from trafficked ivory [5]. These investigations established an alleged link between illegal ivory and terrorism.
Unfortunately, the ivory-terrorism narrative turned out to be grossly inaccurate. Extensive tracking conducted by the Royal United Services Institute revealed that the majority of ivory in East Africa came from Kenya or Tanzania — far, far removed from al-Shabaab’s territory [6]. In other words, large volumes of illegal ivory do not pass through Somalia as previously thought. Instead, ivory is transported primarily at Kenyan and Tanzania ports, making the monthly revenue estimates of $200,000 highly improbable. In this scenario, al-Shabbab would have to pay to export ivory out of Kenya and outprice other competitors, diminishing the organization’s profits far below the claimed $200,000 [7]. All together, few, if any, illegal ivory can be traced back to al-Shabaab. Moreover, the EAL’s claim that ivory supports 40% of the insurgent group’s operating costs was also inaccurate. Using conservative estimates, assuming that ivory does bring in $200,000 a month, that figure would still represent less than 4% of the group’s annual income of $70 million [8]. The narrative presented by the EAL thus proved to be fundamentally flawed, yet continued to spread.
The ivory-terrorism narrative disseminated through the public thanks to the extraordinary volume of journalists and media outlets who misrepresented the EAL’s initial report. For instance, in 2013, the African Environmental Film Foundation launched the documentary White Gold, narrated by former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, that explored the linkage between terrorism and ivory. High profile media outlets including the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, The Economist, and the Financial Times fixated on the elephant-terrorism story without challenging the legitimacy of the linkage. In an analysis of 115 articles citing al-Shabaab involvement in ivory trafficking, more than 70% used either the EAL report as their main or only source, unsupported media reports, or no sources at all [9]. The novelty of the EAL investigation therefore encouraged outlets to continue distribution of the narrative.
Driven by public outrage and the outrageous nature of the report, the world became captivated by the investigation. Kenya-based journalist Tristan McConnell put it best: “Terrorists killing elephants to fund their atrocities is a powerful, troubling story that deftly taps two hotbutton issues” [10]. The narrative became increasingly powerful after al-Shabaab’s 2013 attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall that killed 70 people. In fact, over 80% of reports exploring al-Shabaab’s involvement in the illegal ivory trade came in the two months following the attack [11]. Overall, the ivory-terrorism linkage took off, firstly because it capitalized off of the public’s emotions and passion for these hotbutton issues. The world needed a scapegoat and an eye catching headline, and the idea of terrorists slaughtering elephants for the purpose of killing more was perfect for the role. However, as these reports spread and became the dominant point of view, few people fact checked the report, and the EAL investigation was perpetually distributed. Despite the EAL’s eventual retraction of the claim, affirming that the ivory-terrorism narrative was blown out of proportion, the consequences had already been felt.
The EAL’s inaccurate report spearheaded conservation efforts, positively influencing politicians to introduce conservation legislation. The al-Shabaab-ivory linkage has driven nations around the world to play a bigger role in anti-poaching policies under the guise of counterterrorism. In May 2015, the U.S. Congress introduced the Global Anti-Poaching Act on the basis that a number of rebel groups and terrorist organizations either participate in or draw funding from illicit poaching networks [12]. Likewise, in 2013, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta denounced illegal poaching for its links to terrorist organizations. China, who represents the largest buyer of ivory, followed in suit, eventually banning the sale of illegal ivory within its borders [13]. The ivory-terrorism narrative presented by the EAL established a global call to arms in the fight against illegal ivory.
Though elephant ivory may not be the primary source of al-Shabaab’s funding, the organization is still active in the black market. The terrorist group earns up to $100 million annually, with most of it revolving around the illicit sale of commodities like sugar and charcoal. Charcoal alone represents up to 56% — estimated at $25 million to $56 million — of al-Shabaab’s yearly income [14]. Locally, al-Shabaab exploits commercial activities in areas under their control. They impose strict taxes which take the form of religious taxes, property taxes, consumer taxes, and customs [15]. Problematically, these black market revenue streams have empowered the insurgency, notably fueling recruitment. The organization is known to compensate its fighters much better than the competing Somalian government, encouraging newly trained Somalian soldiers to defect to the Islamic insurgency as a means to obtain financial security. Al-Shabaab reportedly pays its fighters $300-$500 a month — almost five times more than what the Somali government pays its soldiers [16]. Similarly, the group is known to recruit criminals by offering to pay for legal services. As is the case with most criminal syndicates, al-Shabaab’s black market network has been its primary driver of success.
Black markets have thus fostered a fertile environment for al-Shabaab to survive, and dismantling this source of revenue is necessary to ensure the success of future counterterrorism efforts in East Africa. Unfortunately, as al-Shabaab’s revenue stream is multifaceted and complex, tackling the terrorist threat will require a concerted effort by the international community. The ivory-terrorism narrative is consequently a distraction from the real problems. Though the EAL’s report was successful in promoting elephant conservation, the inaccurate investigation of al-Shabaab’s financial strategy muddles policymaking. Moving forward, the international community will be forced to sift through years of misinformation until they can find the primary source of al-Shabaab’s funding.
Al-Shabaab unexpectedly reinvigorated conservation efforts. Misinformation as a result of the EAL’s inaccurate investigation appeared to be an unintended avenue of success, but was nonetheless impactful in the organization’s efforts to scale back the illegal ivory trade. The ivory-terrorism narrative proved to be an effective rallying cry for conservation groups and resulted in the implementation of several key anti-poaching initiatives. The EAL is thus a tale of unexpected success, pushed into hero status due to a dubious claim. Though anti-poaching legislation will likely contribute very little to the counterterrorism effort, the African elephant will live to see another day. However, the spread of misinformation has clouded policymaking. The ivory-terrorism narrative is nothing more than a distraction from the actual forces that prop up the insurgent group. In winning the EAL’s battle, the world inadvertently prolonged the war against terrorism.
Works Cited
[1] Mark Strauss, “Who Buys Ivory? You’d Be Surprised,” National Geographic (2015).
[2] Dave Lawrence, “Helping Hand – Elephant Action League Undercover Investigation on Rhino Horn Trafficking,” Hawaii Public Radio (2017).
[3] Andrea Crosta,”The White Gold of Jihad,” Elephant Action League (2016): 7
[4] Crosta, 5.
[5] Cathy Haenlein, Thomas Maguire & Keith Somerville, “III. Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking and Terrorism,” Whitehall Papers (2016):62
[6] Tom Maguire and Cathy Haenlein, “An Illusion of Complicity: Terrorism and the Illegal Ivory Trade in East Africa,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (2015): 4
[7] Varun Vira and Thomas Ewing, “Ivory’s Curse,” Born Free USA (2014).
[8] Matt Bryden et al., “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916,” UN Security Council (2012): 420-483
[9] Maguire, 19.
[10] Tristan McConnell, ‘Illegal Ivory May Not be Funding African Terror Group’, USA Today (2014).
[11] Maguire, 9.
[12] Global Anti-Poaching Act, H. R. 2494, 114th Cong., 1st Sess, (2015).
[13] Haenlein, 63.
[14] Katharine Petrich, ”Cows, Charcoal, and Cocaine: Al-Shabaab’s Criminal Activities in the Horn of Africa,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2019): 8
[15] Maguire, 22.
[16] Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile. “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia.” ISS Paper 266 (2016).
