Kiki Camarena, The Guadalajara Cartel, and the Start of an International Drug War
By Misha Rekhter
After more than four years chasing drugs around Mexico, Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, a DEA agent stationed in Guadalajara, finally tipped off Mexican law enforcement to raid “Rancho Búfalo” in late 1984. “Rancho Búfalo” was a massive 2,500-acre marijuana plantation run by the Guadalajara cartel. It generated an estimated $8 billion per year in revenue (Beith 47). The raid both frightened and infuriated the Guadalajara cartel, especially public figures whose connections to the cartel needed to remain secret. It is important to note that in the early 1980s, unlike today, the DEA was a smaller agency with little clout. It garnered little to no respect within the widely corrupt infrastructure of Mexican society. After the raid, the cartels suspected Kiki was on the verge of uncovering and exposing more significant cartel trafficking routes and operations. However, before he could do so, corrupt Mexican officials plucked Kiki off the streets of Guadalajara on Feb 7, 1985 (Beith 47). “That was the last time anyone but his kidnappers would see him alive,” as over the ensuing 30-hours following his kidnapping, Kiki was mercilessly tortured and eventually murdered at the home of Rafael Caro Quintero, one of the three leaders of the Guadalajara cartel (Cockburn 349).
This proved to be the turning point in the way the US dealt with drug cartels as it forced the US to come face to face with the brutal realities of the trafficking trade. The harrowing torture and murder of Kiki Camarena at the hands of an intricate crime syndicate consisting of Mexican drug lords, law enforcement, and elected officials, sparked a fresh American vigor for the “War on Drugs” south of the border, while in turn, fundamentally altering the role of the DEA in the perpetual fight between law enforcement and trafficking enterprises.
The size and reach of the Guadalajara cartel was unlike any other drug enterprise that had previously come out of Mexico. In its prime, “the Guadalajara Cartel was the only drug trafficking organization in Mexico, with a corruption network that spanned the country,” (Beith). Originating in the late 1970s, the cartel, run by Rafael Caro Quintero and Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, united Mexico’s narcos like never before (Cockburn 349). Gallardo, nicknamed “El Padrino” (The Godfather), was at the helm of the cartel while Quintero, his co-founder, focused on production. Originally growing and distributing marijuana, Quintero was officially accused of “distributing tens of thousands of tons of marijuana throughout Mexico and into the United States,” (Beith). Additionally, he was the first to introduce “sinsemilla”, seedless marijuana that is more potent and pleasant than traditional marijuana, on a national scale (https://wayofleaf.com/education/what-is-sinsemilla). However, the cartel quickly realized the real money was in cocaine, the more profitable of the two drug trafficking industries. Consequently, Gallardo brokered a healthy working relationship between the Mexican trafficking organizations and their Colombian counterparts during the late 1970s (Lupsha). Culminating with the U.S. government estimating that “50 percent of the cocaine shipped by Colombian organized crime groups towards the United States transits through Mexico,” (Lupsha). These international alliances turned trafficking into a global operation, altering the landscape of the market, and leaving the DEA helplessly in the dust.
This new-found partnership worked favorably for both parties. The Colombians’ business exploded by opening a new pipeline of cocaine to the US through Mexico and the Guadalajara cartel was able to expand into a more profitable industry. The Guadalajara cartel could now use marijuana routes for trafficking cocaine. The margins are much better for cocaine than marijuana. As such, Colombians paid significantly higher rates for cocaine trafficking; therefore, by switching to cocaine, the Guadalajara cartel increased its revenue. The partnership continued to see rapid growth throughout the 1980s as seen by the DEA stating that they “had seized only 200 kilos of cocaine in 1977; but the number of seizures jumped to 60,000 kilos by 1988,” (DEA 60). As the cocaine trade skyrocketed, the Guadalajara cartel was lulled into a false sense of invincibility, believing that their limitless cash would protect them.
While the Guadalajara cartel experienced unprecedented levels of prosperity, Kiki’s murder changed the situation drastically. The vicious nature of Kiki’s torture was harrowing as well as eye-opening to his fellow DEA agents as “over a 30-hour period, Camarena’s skull, jaw, nose, cheekbones and windpipe had been crushed. His ribs were broken; a hole was drilled into his head with a screwdriver,” (Seper). The ramifications are felt to this day as the DEA acknowledged that “no single event has had a more significant impact on DEA than the Camarena abduction and slaying,” (Seper).
The US government implemented “Operation Leyenda” to deal with the fallout from Kiki’s murder. Leyenda’s goal was to bring justice to those responsible for his murder. Ultimately, US officials arrested Quintero, along with several other lower-level members, in direct connection to the Camarena murder (DEA 61). Additionally, Leyenda led to the U.S. discovery of widespread corruption throughout the Mexican government. The first thread to unravel was that the Guadalajara cartel had a significant portion of the Jalisco state police force on its payroll. Additionally, the police force was actually who had originally abducted Kiki, at the request of the cartel (Gaunt). As they kept digging, the horrified U.S. agents discovered that corruption had seeped into every crack of Mexican civilization. Officials, governors, and the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) were all available for the right price. The going rate to buy the loyalty and discretion of someone important was a couple of million dollars. The cartel was more than willing to spend up for the protection and access that powerful friends provided (Gaunt).
The fallout of Kiki’s death and the discoveries of “Operation Leyenda” proved to be immense. The US was emboldened in its pursuit of justice and the DEA grew in notoriety and strength. No longer the pushover that it was when Kiki was there, the DEA was an empowered force that had the full support of the US government behind it. Additionally, the successful capture of core Guadalajara cartel members and an attempt to stem widespread corruption showed the US’ newfound willingness to venture into foreign countries and meddle in their black market activities.
As a response to Kiki’s death at the hands of the Guadalajara cartel, the US gave the DEA unprecedented power and protection to counteract the continued trafficking coming to the US via Mexico. These newfound powers are most evident through the provisions in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. It approved funds, increased international regulations in regard to drugs, and expanded enforcement and prevention methods. Consequently, pouring billions into combating the drug trade through providing funds to those working to prevent drug trafficking and use. Also, the US could now withhold resources from foreign countries that hadn’t put in the effort to stop drug and money laundry related affairs within their own country. Through withholding resources, the US forced countries such as Mexico to cooperate with the DEA. Thus, giving the DEA far more authority in those foreign countries than agents like Kiki had in the past. Additionally, the establishment of the Office for Substance Abuse Prevention (OSAP) and giving unprecedented access to funding lent more credibility to the DEA. The DEA was now “designed to disrupt the growing, processing, and transportation systems supporting the cocaine industry,” and had the resources and tools to do it (DEA 63).
In the wake of Kiki’s death and the US’ aggressive retaliation, Gallardo feared that government interference would bring down his entire empire. The shift in the US’ attitude toward foreign action and the loss of Quintero and Carrillo proved to be the demise of the early 1980s version of the Guadalajara cartel. These events forced Gallardo to reorganize, and rebuild, the Guadalajara empire on the fly. Wanting to drop off the radar, Gallardo held a meeting with Mexico’s largest drug traffickers during which he split Mexico back into distinct chunks, creating separate narco states called “plaza’s.” Various drug-trafficking organizations controlled each plaza (Davis). By doing so, Gallardo brought the business back into the shadows, allowing lesser-known drug lords to operate on a local level. This kept their operations away from the now watchful eye of the DEA and other American organizations. However, by giving more control back to individual plaza bosses, Gallardo sacrificed, at least for the time being, the scale uniformity that he enforced within the Guadalajara cartel. Consequently, the separate plazas, or at least their remnants, fight amongst themselves for terrority and trafficking routes to this day, despite Gallardo’s arrest in 1989 [Beith 47]. This is not to suggest that the business of drugs or corruption has diminished in Mexico as the Sinaloa, Juarez, and Tijuana cartels are as active, violent, and wealthy as ever.
In fact, the whole operation rebranded and expanded in the early 1990s. In the 1980s, the Guadalajara cartel simply moved Columbian cocaine for cash, while in the 1990s, the Mexican cartels struck a new deal, opting to receive cocaine to sell themselves rather than receive cash for their trafficking (Bonner 35-47). This was significant as it allowed the Mexican cartels to move up in the world of the drug business. Moving drugs for a lump sum is enough to get rich, but vertically integrating the whole business gave the cartels access to unimaginable wealth. This becomes clear when “the Sinaloa cartel can buy a kilo of cocaine in the highlands of Colombia or Peru for around $2,000, then watch it accrue value as it makes its way to market. In Mexico, that kilo fetches more than $10,000. Jump the border to the United States, and it could sell wholesale for $30,000. Break it down into grams to distribute retail, and that same kilo sells for upward of $100,000 — more than its weight in gold” (Keefe). Regardless of how much the Colombian cartels could have been paying the Guadalajara cartel (this information is unsurprisingly not available), the move to distribute cocaine on their own proved to be very profitable for the Mexican cartels.
Additionally, as a result of this shift in trafficking philosophy, Mexican cartels established their own distribution networks throughout the United States. In doing so, it “realigned the power dynamics along the narcotics supply chain in the Americas, because it allowed the Mexicans to stop serving as logistical middlemen and invest in their own drugs instead,” (Keefe). This shift in philosophy is what led to the Mexican cartels becoming what they are today: intricately set up international businesses that have a hand in a variety of industries, seemingly unlimited funds, and a penchant for illegal drugs, arms, and violence. The cartels continue to oversee massive drug trafficking operations, that grow trickier and more intricate with every bust, and there seems to be no real end in sight to the “War on Drugs,” (Bonner 35-47).
However, Kiki’s death did serve as a turning point in how America dealt with drug trafficking. Before his tragic passing, Kiki and other drug enforcement agents were not widely respected and received minimal assistance for their operations. Additionally, corruption ran rampant in foreign government and police forces, making the jobs of people like Kiki effectively impossible. However, Kiki’s perseverance in spite of numerous setbacks and his ability to work with informants, Kiki originally discovered “Rancho Búfalo” due to an informant tip, demonstrated that creating change was possible. Kiki’s success with informants proved to be foreshadowing for how the DEA would operate to take down cartels in the future. In particular, Kiki’s success with such limited resources made it clear that with better support and funding, the DEA could be an increasingly effective organization. Consequently, the most tragic and tangible consequence of Kiki’s death was that his passing directly led to the increased protection of DEA agents around the globe. The very protection that Kiki needed to stay alive is now afforded to all DEA agents because of his heroic actions.
This is what makes Kiki such a pivotal figure in the history of the international drug trade: his death changed the rules of the game. In one fell swoop following Kiki’s death, the DEA suddenly received unprecedented protection worldwide, the funding for the “War on Drugs” skyrocketed, and whole trafficking organizations reshuffled to stay ahead of the now irate American law enforcement. Kiki’s death awakened the beast that is the American government. With a renewed vigor, America bulldozed its way into various South American countries attempting to squash the rampant corruption and cartel activities. To this day, Kiki Camarena remains at the core of American international drug enforcement. Kiki’s efforts and eventual death altered the way cartels and government agencies went about their business, thus shifting the landscape of the international “War on Drugs” forever.
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